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Abstract—This paper presents LIRA-V, a lightweight system
for performing remote attestation between constrained devices
using the RISC-V architecture. We propose using read-only
memory and the RISC-V Physical Memory Protection (PMP)
primitive to build a trust anchor for remote attestation and secure
channel creation. Moreover, we propose a bi-directional attesta-
tion protocol for trusted device-to-device communication, which
is subjected to formal symbolic verification using SCYTHER. We
present the design, implementation and evaluation of LIRA-V
using an off-the-shelf RISC-V microcontroller and present per-
formance results to demonstrate its suitability. To our knowledge,
we present the first remote attestation mechanism suitable for
constrained RISC-V devices, with applications to the Internet of
Things (IoT) and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS).
I. INTRODUCTION
Constrained devices, e.g., microcontroller units (MCUs), are
used ubiquitously in home and building automation, manufac-
turing, assistive technologies, and industrial control systems.
In these situations, it is important to prevent damaging be-
haviour arising from malware and other unauthorised software.
To this end, remote attestation (RA) protocols have been
developed to assess remote devices for the presence of unau-
thorised software. RA is a challenge-response protocol where
a remote verifier, V , ascertains the platform operating state of a
proving device, P . RA systems rely on a trusted component—
a trust anchor—for measuring and signing response reports, or
quotes, from V . Increasingly, constrained devices are equipped
with CPU security extensions from which trust anchors can be
built with hardware-assisted secure execution.
Introduced in 2010, RISC-V is a major architectural diver-
gence from popular proprietary architectures, such as Intel and
ARM. Consequently, their associated security technologies,
e.g., Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone respectively, cannot
be readily used for creating RA trust anchors on RISC-V
devices. Meanwhile, other traditional roots of trust, namely
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and hardware secure
elements, are generally considered too cumbersome for MCU-
type devices [1]–[4].
RA mechanisms have hitherto been developed for high-end
RISC-V devices using privileged CPU protection modes to
implement a security monitor, as used by Keystone [5] and
Lebedev et al. [6]. However, current work is yet to address con-
strained RISC-V devices that have limited computing power,
may not possess a memory management unit (MMU), and may
only use a single application and CPU protection mode.
This paper presents the first RA mechanism for such con-
strained RISC-V devices. We leverage the Physical Memory
Protection (PMP) primitive [7] and read-only memory (ROM)
to build a trust anchor that avoids requiring a fully-fledged
TEE or external security hardware, such as a TPM or secure
element. Specifically, we leverage PMP to create execute-
only memory as a lightweight method for protecting quote
signing key secrecy, while ROM ensures the integrity of
RA measurement and reporting procedures. With this, we
present the design and development of the first RISC-V RA
mechanism with bi-directional attestation for secure device-
to-device communication. To support this, we propose a novel
mutual attestation protocol, which is subjected to formal sym-
bolic analysis using SCYTHER [8]. LIRA-V is implemented
and evaluated using an off-the-shelf RISC-V MCU, which
executes in ∼11–32s for secure and mutually trusted channel
creation when attesting 64–256KB of memory on both devices.
The average case occupies <4KB RAM, thus demonstrating
suitability for IETF Class 1 and 2 constrained devices [9].
II. RISC-V PRELIMINARIES
RISC-V is an open-source, load-store instruction set archi-
tecture (ISA) with variable word widths (32, 64 and 128 bits)
that enables vendors to pursue modular chip design. Devices
must support the base ISA with 32-bit integer operations as a
minimum requirement. Vendors may implement various exten-
sions thereafter, such as single and double-precision floating-
point, hypervisor, vector, and single-instruction multiple data
instructions. Cryptographic and trusted execution environment
(TEE) extensions are under development at the time of writing.
The RISC-V Privileged Architecture Specification [7] de-
scribes three CPU privilege modes: machine (M), supervisor
(S) and user (U) mode. M mode is the highest privileged
level, akin to EL3 in ARMv8, that is intended for device
firmware, e.g., bootloaders. Machine mode is uninterruptible,
cannot be disrupted by lower privilege levels, and is the first
mode entered upon a device reset. M mode also operates only
on physical addresses; it does not access memory using virtual
Fig. 1. RISC-V PMP configuration registers [7].
address translation. All RISC-V implementations must support
M mode as a mandatory requirement. S-mode is designed for
privileged OS services, such as virtual memory management,
while U-mode is intended for low privilege applications.
In general, embedded devices—the focus of this work—are
envisaged to possess either only M or M and U modes [7].
Physical Memory Protection (PMP) is a security enhance-
ment to the RISC-V architecture first proposed in 2017 that al-
lows the designation of access control permissions—read (R),
write (W), execute (X)—to particular physical memory address
regions while in machine mode. PMP is configured using a
dedicated bank of RISC-V control status registers (CSRs) that
specify the desired permission and the associated address (A)
region. Setting the PMP lock (L) bit can be optionally used to
prevent M-mode from modifying that region’s access control
permissions once set; locked registers are released only when
the CPU is reset. PMP checks are applied to all memory
accesses when the current processor privilege mode is in S- or
U-mode when the L is not set, or to all modes when L is set.
Setting the target region and its access control parameters is
performed using banks of PMP address (pmpaddr) and PMP
configuration (pmpcfg) registers, shown in Fig. 1.
III. REMOTE ATTESTATION AND RELATED WORK
Traditional RA involves a remote verifier, V , that requests
the operating state of a single target device, P . At a high
level, RA systems comprise measurement and reporting stages.
Historically, the TPM developed by the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) has served as a popular root of trust for storing
system measurements. The TPM computes a cryptographically
secure hash function over critical system component binaries
and stores these measurements in its platform configuration
registers (PCRs). During the reporting phase, the PCR values
are signed using a hardware-bound attestation identity key
(AIK) to produce the quote report that is sent P → V .
RA protocols have been proposed using various software
and hardware trust anchors, such as physically unclonable
functions (PUFs) [6], [10]; TEEs, e.g., Intel SGX and ARM
TrustZone [11]–[13]; and custom hardware for read-only and
guaranteed execution (TyTan [2], SMART [1], VRASED [14],
TrustLite [15], HYDRA [3]). Comparing known measure-
ments at regular time intervals (ERASMUS [16]), travers-
ing control-flow integrity (CFI) graphs [17]–[22], and using
execution time as an out-of-band channel (SWATT [23] and
Pioneer [24]) have also been explored.
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Fig. 2. Bi-directional or mutual remote attestation.
These schemes address attestation involving a single P
and V . Here, V transmits an attestation request to P , which
measures the state of a single or multiple software components
at boot- or run-time. The measurement quote is signed using
a private key accessible only to the trust anchor, which is
returned to and verified by V using the corresponding public
key. In contrast, an emerging paradigm is the development
of proposals that attest multiple devices in a single protocol
instance. Mutual or bi-directional RA has been proposed
for attesting and bootstrapping secure channels between two
devices—shown in Fig. 2—using ARM TrustZone [13], [25],
TPMs [26], [27], and PUFs as trust anchors [10]. In other
work, the Seda [28] and SANA [29] systems address RA of
device swarms by constructing an efficient topological path
between its constituents and aggregating the responses for V .
The reader is referred to Ambrosin et al. [30] for a recent
comprehensive survey of collective attestation schemes.
IV. PROPOSED MEASUREMENT PROCEDURE
This work contributes to the area of mutual remote attesta-
tion by proposing a novel mechanism using ROM and RISC-
V PMP as a trust anchor. The following sections describe the
threat model and system design in detail.
A. Threat Model and Design Goals
We consider a privileged software adversary that has read,
write and execute access to memory that is not explicitly
protected by hardware-assisted access control, i.e. PMP and
read-only memory. Such an adversary may exploit an existing
software vulnerability—a vulnerable network service or con-
nected I/O device—that provides access unprotected memory
regions. The attacker then establishes a persistent presence on
the device by overwriting untrusted memory. The attacker may
operate in M mode, which may be the only CPU protection
mode supported by a constrained device. However, in line with
other hardware-based RA proposals, we do trust the RISC-V
PMP primitive and a ROM unit for preserving the integrity
of signing keys and the core root of trust for measurement
(CRTM) code. As such, sophisticated attacks that bypass the
protections afforded by PMP, like physical fault injections,
are considered beyond the scope of this work. Additionally,
we assume that the measuring procedure executes atomically.
Numerous proposals have been made for enforcing this [31],
[32] using a small hardware extension for validating program
counter (PC) bounds to enforce code entry points. Unlike ex-
isting proprietary processor architectures, this is significantly
eased by the open-source nature of many RISC-V cores.
The following security goals are addressed in this work:
[G1] Measurement Procedure Integrity: the proposal shall
resist privileged attacks that attempt to modify the code
for measuring the device’s current operating state.
[G2] Signing Key Secrecy: the key used for signing response
quotes for entity authentication shall remain secret against
privileged adversaries under the threat model.
[G3] Secure Channel Creation: the proposed mechanism
shall bootstrap a secure channel for bi-directional data
transfer between P and V with mutual entity authentica-
tion, replay protection, and forward secrecy.
[G4] Bi-Directional Attestation: secure channel creation shall
be predicated on P and V having known and authorised
platform configuration states in a single protocol instance.
The following deployability goals are also considered:
[D1] Constrained Device Suitability: the proposed system
shall be suitable for constrained devices, e.g., MCUs. We
assume the devices can execute standard public-key cryp-
tographic algorithms, but can benefit from lightweight
mechanisms due to computational constraints. This cor-
responds to IETF Class 1+2 devices (10–50KB RAM,
100–250KB storage, and a CPU in the MHz range) [9].
[D2] Cost and Flexibility: the proposal shall avoid relying
upon external security hardware or CPU extensions, such
as privilege modes unlikely to exist on embedded devices,
e.g., hypervisor modes, and security co-processors.
B. Proposed Measurement Procedure
The proposed trust anchor is underpinned by two trusted
components: the RISC-V PMP primitive for configuring phys-
ical memory regions with access control permissions (see §II)
and ROM code for configuring PMP registers at start-up. The
target is a standard, single-core embedded system with its
components deployed in a system-on-chip (SoC) that executes
basic configuration routines in ROM before transferring con-
trol to the primary program in persistent memory. LIRA-V
comprises the following stages, shown in Fig. 3:
1) PMP Configuration: Following a reset signal and basic
SoC setup, ROM code is used to assign PMP access control
permissions to physical memory regions. A single PMP entry
is configured to denote execute-only (X-only) permissions to
the region that encompasses the quote signing key (QSK)
embedded in its associated signing method. For measurement
integrity, ROM is used to host the CRTM and its dependent
cryptographic algorithms.
2) Attestation Request: The attestation agent (AA) is
untrusted code that implements the services for transmit-
ting/receiving attestation messages to/from V over a network
medium, e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or LPWAN. AA invokes the
ROM CRTM for executing the measurement procedure after
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Fig. 3. Remote attestation measurement execution flow. Trusted components
shown in green, untrusted in yellow, and PMP-configured regions are hatched.
3) CRTM: The ROM CRTM computes an aggregated
hash of the device physical memory region of the form
H({mi,mi+1, . . . ,mi+b}, H({mi+1+b,mi+2+b, . . . ,mi+j+b},
H(. . . ))), where H(·) is a cryptographic hash function, mi is
the contents of the ith address, and b is the address block size
to be hashed. The attested region is pre-programmed in ROM
CRTM that encompasses all or part of the memory map. We
evaluate the performance of varying regions in §VII.
4) Quote Signing: The aggregated measurement is signed
using the ROM QSK for entity authentication. The correspond-
ing verification key is held by V before deployment. As per
[G2] (§IV-A), the QSK must remain confidential to prevent
an adversary forging valid quotes while unauthorised software
persists on the device. We leverage RISC-V PMP to set X-
only memory to a signing procedure with an embedded QSK
as a lightweight method for achieving this. Lastly, the signed
attestation quote is placed into AA-readable memory.
5) Attestation Response: AA returns the attestation quote
(AQ) to V as part of a secure remote attestation protocol (§V),
who verifies the signature and whether the quote measurement
conforms to expectations.
V. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section develops the reporting phase of LIRA-V for
secure quote transmission, which formalises a novel secure
channel protocol with bi-directional attestation.
A. Assumptions and Threat Model
From [G3] and [G4] (§IV-A), the aim is to bootstrap a
secure channel following mutual attestation—see Fig. 2—
where two constrained devices serve as P and V . Each device
is assumed to implement the measurement procedure outlined
in §IV. During the protocol, we address network-based adver-
saries that attempt to forge attestation responses and intercept,
replay, redirect and otherwise manipulate protocol messages
permitted under the Dolev-Yao adversarial model. We assume
that the proving devices can access a cryptographically secure
entropy source for random number generation and can execute
standard public key cryptography algorithms ([D1], §IV-A).
Protocol 1 Proposed Mutual Attestation Protocol
1: A→ B : nA || qA || AR
2: B → A : nB || qB || AR || AEK(QB || σB(H(QB || nA
|| nB || qB || qA)))
3: A→ B : AEK(QA || σA(H(QA || nA || nB || qA || qB))
TABLE I
NOTATION FOR PROTOCOL 1.
Notation Description
DID Identifier of device D, e.g, IP address or UUID.
nD Cryptographically secure nonce generated by D.
qD
Public ECDH value generated by D (scalar multiplication
of an agreed base and D’s randomly generated secret point.)
AR Attestation request operation.
H(·) Cryptographically secure one-way hash function.
X || Y Concatenation of X and Y .
AEK(·) Authenticated symmetric encryption algorithm keyed with K.
QD Measurement response quote signed by D.
σD(·) Message signed by D using crytographic signature algorithm.
B. Offline Phase
Each device is provisioned a unique QSK used during
the measurement phase for entity authentication. The corre-
sponding public key and expected measurements for verify-
ing responses are provisioned into the opposing devices in
PMP-protected ROM by an administrator. For performance, a
compact signature scheme is suggested, e.g., Ed25519 (256-
bit key sizes). Devices may also be enrolled in a group
signature scheme with multiple QSKs mapped to a single
group verification key for scalability purposes. Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellmann (ECDH) key exchange is proposed as an
efficient basis for mutual key agreement. As such, common
domain parameters, ∆ = (p, a, b,G, η, h) (in the prime case),
must be standardised across devices. The domain parameters,
signature verification keys, and expected measurement hashes
are provisioned in trusted ROM prior to deployment.
C. Online Phase
The proposed mutual RA protocol is presented in Protocol
1, comprising three messages between devices A and B:
1) M1: A initiates the protocol with B by transmitting a
cryptographically secure nonce, nA; its public ECDH point,
qA = dA · G, where dA is the randomly generated private
key and G is the base using domain parameters, ∆; and an
attestation request flag, AR, of A→ B.
2) M2: B executes the measurement process in §IV to
produce its signed attestation quote, QB . B generates its
secure nonce, nB , and ECDH public point, qB = dB · G.
Using qA from A, B derives the shared ECDH secret using
dB · qA · G, and applies a key derivation function to derive
an ephemeral session key, K. This key is used with an
authenticated encryption algorithm, AE, e.g., AES-GCM, to
encrypt its quote response, QB , and a signed message of
H(QB ||nA||nB ||qB ||qA) signed using B’s QSK.
3) M3: A computes the shared ECDH secret (dA · qB ·G)
and derives K. A decrypts M2 the sent by B and verifies
the signature and measurements of QB therein. A aborts the
protocol if QB fails A’s signature verification, the measure-
ments deviate from the expected value, or AE contains an
invalid authentication tag. Next, A executes its measurement
procedure, after which AEK is used to encrypt the measured
quote, QA, and H(QA||nA||nB ||qA||qB) under A’s QSK,
which are sent to B. B then validates the signature and
measurement contents of A’s quote using its public key. 
D. Formal Verification
We subject the proposed bi-directional attestation proto-
col to formal verification using the SCYTHER analyser [8],
which operates under the symbolic model using the per-
fect cryptography assumption. Previously, SCYTHER has been
used to formally verify Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1 and
IKEv2) [33], ISO/IEC 9798 [34] and 11770 [35] protocol
families, and WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) [36]. A given protocol
is specified using the Security Protocol Description Language
(SPDL) defining the communicating entities (roles); the pro-
tocol messages using built-in primitives, e.g., nonces, hash
functions, symmetric and public-key signature algorithms,
and user-defined types; and the security properties to assess
(claims). SCYTHER analyses whether the claims hold against
all possible behaviours of a Dolev-Yao adversary (traces)
using the protocol specification. No attacks were discovered
on the proposed protocol; the claims of quote and session
key secrecy (confidentiality), reachability, aliveness (weak au-
thentication) and non-injective agreement and synchronisation
(replay attack protection) were successfully maintained. The
full protocol specification is released freely.1
VI. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION
A. Platform Specifications
We implemented a proof-of-concept of our proposal using
the SiFive HiFive1 Rev B—a 32-bit RISC-V single-board
computer with a low-powered FE310-G002 MCU SoC with
16KB SRAM and 4MB off-chip SPI flash memory. The SoC
hosts a single-core E31 CPU at 320MHz; a 16KB L1 instruc-
tion cache; multiplication, atomic, and compressed instruction
extensions (RV32IMAC); and support for the Privileged Ar-
chitecture specification with 8 configurable PMP registers [7].
B. Measurement Phase
The CRTM (§IV-B) enumerates a memory range in con-
tiguous blocks between two pre-programmed addresses. On
request, the CRTM function computes an aggregated hash
of the memory contents in this range to create the raw
measurement. SHA-3 was used as the hash function using
tiny_sha3, a portable implementation of FIPS-202/SHA-
3 [37]. The Freedom Metal library of the Freedom E SDK—a
1Protocol SCYTHER source URL: https://cs.gl/extra/ecc-btp-scyther.spdl
TABLE II
MEAN PROTOCOL WALL-CLOCK TIMES (SECONDS) BY DEVICE FOR
VARIOUS ATTESTED MEMORY RANGES (1KB BLOCKS, 100 ITRS.; 4.S.F).
Total CRTM Attested Memory
64KB 128KB 256KB
Message A B Total A B Total A B Total
M1: A→ B 0.342 0.049 0.391 0.346 0.052 0.398 0.341 0.048 0.389
M2: B → A 1.073 4.698 5.771 1.069 8.289 9.358 1.067 14.93 16.00
M3: A→ B 4.701 0.097 4.798 8.302 0.103 8.405 14.92 0.090 15.01
Grand Total 6.116 4.844 10.96 9.717 8.444 18.16 16.33 15.07 31.40
hardware abstraction layer for providing portability between
Freedom E RISC-V targets—was used for PMP configuration.
The SDK provides C interfaces for configuring pmpcfg and
pmpaddr registers to assign access control permissions, e.g.,
R/W/X/L (Fig. 1), to a contiguous memory address region.
C. Quote Reporting
The protocol was implemented using the RISC-V port of the
Network and Cryptography Library (NaCl) for ECC mutual
key agreement using X25519 and symmetric authenticated en-
cryption using the XSalsa20-Poly1305 construction [38], [39].
SHA-3 served as the CRTM hash function using tiny_sha3,
an embedded implementation of FIPS-202/SHA-3 [37]. For
QSK, Ed25519 was employed using an adapted implementa-
tion from the Keystone project [5]. This adaption replaced
using a byte buffer for defining the signing key with an
assembly routine that loaded immediate values from PMP-
protected static memory for X-only execution. Both devices
were connected to a Windows workstation over USB serial for
inter-device connectivity and protocol orchestration. A Python
script was developed for benchmarking runs using the Time
module with microsecond precision, and used the PySerial
module for initiating the protocol on device A over the serial
interface. The timer was terminated by the script after reading
an acknowledgement serial message from device B after it
received and validated [M3] (§V-C).
VII. EVALUATION
A. Performance Analysis
Our implementation was cross-compiled for 32-bit RISC-
V platforms using the GNU C Compiler with the -0s
optimisation flag, and deployed on both boards using the
Freedom E SDK [40]. The stack and heap were globally
limited to use 6KB and 1KB respectively per device. We
first benchmarked the total protocol execution time and its
distribution by message and entity. Here, the protocol was
executed 100 times using the setup in §VI-C for total attested
memory ranges between 64KB–256KB. The mean execution
times were computed for each message and by device. The
results are presented in Table II and Fig. 4. The measurements
show that [M2] and [M3] dominate the total execution time,
accounting for ∼48% per message of the total protocol time.
From this, we further characterised CRTM measurement
time against the attested memory size and the block size (the
number of contiguous memory addresses that are hashed).

























































































Fig. 5. CRTM execution time for varying attested memory and block sizes.
The default block size was tested at values between 1KB—
4KB, the maximum our test devices could accommodate,2
while the total attested memory ranged from 1KB to the
maximum size of flash memory (4MB). These results are
shown in Table III and Fig. 5. Expectedly, the measurement
time is directly proportional to the total attested memory. At
worst, attesting 4MB required 207.2s (1KB blocks) and 201.1s
(4KB). In general, the rate of increase is ∼1.6s for every 32KB
of attested memory, while the total time doubles for each
doubling of attesting memory. A 1KB–4KB increase in block
size produces a small reduction (∼3%) of the measurement
time, thus exhibiting a memory-time trade-off given the greater
required stack allocation for 4KB blocks.
B. Security Evaluation, Attacks, and Countermeasures
The threat model in §IV-A describes a privileged adversary
that can access memory that is not protected by hardware
security. In §IV, we proposed moving the root of trust to
ROM, which executes immediately following a device reset
and before the execution of untrusted memory. This configures
PMP regions to secure the integrity of the CRTM, thus
satisfying [G1]. The confidentiality of QSKs is preserved by
embedding the key into an X-only signing routine configured
in start-up ROM using PMP with the L-bit set, thus meeting
[G2]. We also proposed a novel protocol that bootstraps a
secure channel using ephemeral keys and the mutual attestation
of both devices for meeting [G3] and [G4]. We now analyse
some specific attacks under the threat model in §IV-A:
[A1] Modifying QSK’s PMP address range or its access
control permissions. The QSK PMP entry is locked
after being set by start-up ROM, which prevents writes
2The global stack required 6KB when using 4KB blocks, while only a 4KB
stack was needed to support 1KB blocks in our implementation.
TABLE III
MEAN WALL-CLOCK CRTM EXECUTION TIME (SECONDS) FOR VARYING MEMORY BLOCK SIZES AND TOTAL MEMORY (100 ITRS.; 4 S.F.).
Block 1KB 2KB 4KB 8KB 16KB 32KB 64KB 128KB 256KB 512KB 1MB 2MB 4MB
1KB 0.050 0.102 0.206 0.411 0.826 1.646 3.311 6.625 13.25 26.53 54.76 103.5 207.2
2KB — 0.099 0.202 0.409 0.823 1.650 3.309 6.621 13.24 26.41 53.71 102.6 204.0
4KB — — 0.191 0.398 0.802 1.609 3.212 6.431 12.86 25.53 50.27 100.5 201.1
to its configuration (pmpcfg) and address (pmpaddr)
registers in M mode. Locked entries are released only
after a device reset; since PMP registers are configured
before untrusted memory is afforded control, the attacker
is unable to modify QSK’s PMP registers after boot-time.
[A2] Transferring removable flash memory. Many embedded
devices rely on removable memory, e.g., SD cards. The
trust anchor—QSK and PMP configuration code—resides
in ROM, and so replacing removable memory would
affect attestation agent and signed quote availability. The
device would be unable to respond to RA requests,
akin to disabling the device. Such attacks are difficult
to address without non-removable memory or tamper-
resistant casing.
[A3] Adversary overwrites the attestation quote (AQ) in un-
trusted memory. This yields effects akin to [A2]: the
device will fail to transmit a valid quote to V , therefore
failing the attestation process and notifying V of an issue.
[A4] Leveraging side-effects of X-only code. We use RISC-V
PMP to assign an X-only region to protect the confiden-
tiality of quote signing. A general limitation of X-only
code is that, while direct reads and writes are prohibited,
CPU caches and registers still exhibit the effects of
executed code. Consequently, these must be correctly
sanitised to mitigate potential information leakage before
returning control flow to untrusted memory.
C. Limitations
Our proposal focused on single-core MCUs that possess
a single application and CPU protection mode. Attesting
dynamically loaded tasks or applications using a real-time OS
(RTOS) poses greater challenges, which we defer to future
research. Secondly, by relaxing the atomicity requirement,
we are able to construct a lightweight and portable system
that requires no additional security hardware, e.g., TPMs, or
CPU protection modes. As such, our proposal is not best
suited against sophisticated adaptive malware that transiently
and reactively relocates during the attestation process to
avoid detection. Addressing this challenge remains an open
challenge in the literature without resorting to additional
hardware [1], [14], [31], which contravenes [D1] (§IV-A).
Both Nunes et al. [14] and Francillon et al. [31] propose
countermeasures using dedicated hardware extensions that
enforce controlled invocation and PC validation. In future
work, we aim to investigate the use of PMP and trusted ROM
to provide these properties. Furthermore, we consider our
proof-of-concept performance measurements baseline results:
optimisation was not the primary objective, and it is likely
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF RELATED RA PROPOSALS USING CRITERIA FROM §IV-A.
Root of Trust Work G1 G2 G3 G4 D1 D2
TPM
Gasmi et al. [27]
Greveler et al. [26]
TPM 2.0 DAA [41]
PUF Lebedev et al. [6]







GP TEE Shepherd et al. [13]




EA-MPU: Execution-aware memory protection unit, GP: GlobalPlatform.
: Satisfies, : Partially satisfies, : Unsatisfactory.
that significant benefits could be made through using, for
example, a hardware-accelerated hash function for the CRTM.
Lastly, a compromised device may refuse to participate in
RA protocols by dropping messages to/from V . Such non-
participation attacks are generally beyond the scope of RA
systems. A countermeasure is fixing RA timeouts and black-
listing or investigating unresponsive devices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented LIRA-V, a lightweight attestation
system for RISC-V constrained devices. The proposed system
uses on-board ROM and PMP to build X-only memory for
preserving the integrity and confidentiality of attestation mea-
surement and reporting assets. To the best of our knowledge,
LIRA-V is the first RA mechanism for RISC-V constrained
devices that precludes the need for dedicated security hardware
or CPU privilege modes as a trust anchor. Moreover, we go be-
yond related work (Table IV) and present a novel secure chan-
nel protocol for supporting mutual attestation, which is suitable
for trusted device-to-device communication. We presented a
multi-part evaluation with performance measurements from an
implementation on an off-the-shelf RISC-V MCU, alongside
a security analysis and a limitations discussion. Future work
includes, once standardised, migrating and evaluating post-
quantum cryptography for constrained device attestation.
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